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Abstract: Out of a sense of nationhood or out of mere circumstantial and specific references to a 
national  context,  it  is  altogether  visible  that  anti-universalist  debate  is  making  headway  in 
international relations, in cultural studies and in the political science, if we are to classify a broader 
consultation  of  events.  This  article  aims  at  presenting  how  the  Western  ideas  can  be  seen  in 
examination, as artificial structures, in the national context of Asia. The Asian Values are a very 
interesting evaluative specimen of the anti-universalist orations. In the case of many Asian states, they 
created settled forms of government, having a special adaptation with the originating incidents that 
were their birthplace. With the inward of these units of contextualization, we will turn to the conferral 
of the Singapore democracy model and to its German block and bond with the Asian Values. We will 
interrelate a personal conspectus regarding the correctness of the seal of fastening between the Asian 
Values and Singapore’s democracy model. 
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1. The Asian Values` Diorama 
The Asian Values are an exhibition of the nisus of perseverance of some Asian 
states in trying to scale a firewall against the world’s interconnectedness and the 
negative homogenizing effects of globalization
1. They are resistant to them, yet 
they do not aim at the same tendency of thrusting out. They do not aim to use the 
same checking and adjusting with the same global marks. They pine for flattened 
environmental conditions of growth and ambience. They do not propose a system 
                                                       
1 In the terms of reference of this article, we use the term of globalization in order to denote the 
intensification, to a world-scale, of ideas, of Western origin, of how inter-state relations need to be 
conducted and regularized and how the exploration and development of inter-state relations need to 
be fulfilled by implements.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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that can be comfortable to all countries, but rather a system that can impact the 
circle of acquaintances, only for Asian countries.  
From this side-view, Western Values have been shepherded by an agreement of the 
few. They cannot represent an item of collective solicitation for all the states on the 
global  arena,  since  not  all  the  states  took  part  in  their  ontogenesis. 
Representatively, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was not an 
emanation of all the countries in the world. Then, if the participation at its drafting 
was not unanimous, how can each and every state in the world esteem and venerate 
its provisions as a moral and impartial ordinance? Some states may feel that, since 
they could not affirm a stance in the fashioning of the democratic principles, of the 
respect for human rights and civil liberties, then why are they expected to field 
the same manufacture in their own domestic environ? The virtue and quality of the 
Asian Values discourse is that these values are anti-universal in pith and meaning. 
The Asian Values take the airfoil from a de-colonized Asian continent, a continent 
which suffered from the neediness of self-rule and determination
1. They reproduce 
the  conceptual  breed  of  an  Asia  by  Asians,  an  Asia  created  by  the  regional 
governments and not by extrinsic actors: 
“[…] Asian values
2 are the cultural orientations, beliefs, norms, or attitudes unique 
to the Asian region that form the base of their political, economic, and cultural 
institutions and processes [...]. Notably, Asian Values are themselves multifaceted 
norms, and thus it is very common in the literature to mention more than one trait 
when defining Asian Values”. (Young, 2010)  
Asian Values are a genotype of Asia and plunk for Asian particularity, despite the 
fact that they cannot be settled in a casing of some sort or another. The Asian 
countries have very different cultures and civilizations, or different construing of 
the same culture and/or civilization
3. Then, how can a surety be pledged among all 
the Asian Values, so that some recurrence can be envisioned between them? After 
all, they affirm that they reside for a genotype of Asian thinking
4. This genotype 
would include, in a very capacious manner: the importance of collective reasoning 
                                                       
1  The  shaping  of  colonialism  fathered  the  generation  of  the  endogenous  principles  of  inter-state 
encounters and of how they should be managed. 
2 For this passage, the author chose to use the bold and italics for the syntagm of Asian Values; 
Likewise, the word values is written, with a capital letter, by the author`s choosing; They did not 
appear in this form in the original text. 
3 Depending on how the cultural centerpieces were obtained and taken up all around Asia.  
4 We used this sneer of verbalism in order to underline the fact that the genetic constitution of the 
Asian Values emerged from the loyalty to cultural relativism.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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and of making decisions preferably within a congregated assembly, a penchant for 
hierarchy - as the most efficient ordering principle, both in society and in public 
affairs, a druthers for consensualism as a method of decision-making, instead of 
the more discordant manners of majority ruling
1, the confirmation of the familial 
setting as the most important collective organism
2, the propound for informalism 
as an authoritative tenet for engagements, both inter-state and inter-personal
3. If 
such all-embracing concepts take on a habitual acknowledgement, it is not a slight 
and strained idea that others will issue in accordance.  
 
2. The  Mutiny  between  the  Singapore  Democracy  Model  and  Asian 
Values 
The master narratives of the Singapore Democracy Model have to be met with the 
attendant  of  the  computations  of  its  old  days  and,  particularly,  of  the  earnest 
inquiries of how Singapore envisioned its state-building amidst the queer accents 
of the post-War period. Like any other state in Southeast Asia, Singapore had to go 
through  a  grossly  unconventional  environment  of  foiling  and  scupper.  The 
conditions were invert – a commonality that all the Southeast Asian states had to 
experience
4.  On  the  back  of  the  envelope  of  these  conditions,  there  stood 
Singapore’s ticket for statehood and independent action
5. If we are to reply to the 
major scientific contributions regarding Malay history
6, we have to admit that the 
                                                       
1 Even if the majority decides, there is always a minority which can never find enough compensation 
and compliance for the decision adopted; If the majority ruling is taken by a weak or a very fragile 
majority, then it is likely that the indemnifications of the decision would be even fewer and points of 
disparity would sooner or later disunite the grouping; Against this kind of outcome, the Asian Values 
present for consideration consensual decision-making. 
2 The relations within the state or within the society have to function as the relations within a family, 
with the same respectful ascribing.  
3 Formalism is thought to be a corsair of inter-personal and inter-state relations; If the agreements 
adopted would require a formal pout, then the trust between the participating parties is barren of 
actual meaning. 
4 Certainly, variations can be drawn; Some experienced this situation more than others; For instance, 
the Indochinese states had to make their entrance on the global scene, by opposing the continuous 
liaise  intercession  of  the  French  neo-colonialism;  Indonesia  was,  also,  not  a  sleight-of-hand 
performer in confronting outer forms of suppression: the Dutch neo-colonialism tried desperately to 
reignite its left-over flickers.  
5 Independence, for Singapore, would share some of the padded edges that Malaysia`s independence 
had: independence of a very unusual nature; Each and every Southeast Asian state has a very different 
account of the method used to achieve its independence; In the case of Malaysia, independence was 
achieved, by bits and pieces within almost the same pattern.  
6 Comprising, for some years, Singapore`s history.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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Malay  people  did  not  seal  the  same  the  same  convulsing  nature  against  the 
extraneous  elements,  of  European  extraction,  as  Indonesia  did.  The  egress  of 
British dominion in the Malay territories was enacted by the agreements of 1867, 
when  the  territories  became  parts  of  the  British  colonial  possessions  in  Asia, 
alongside India
1. These security arrangements transformed the Malayan territories 
into protected parts of the British Empire.  
The historical connection between Singapore and the  Malayan territories was a 
convivial  one,  at  least  up  to  a  point.  The  slight  shelter  of  closeness  was 
implemented by the desire of the British to prognosticate their hold on the colonial 
possessions as much as possible. The final bearing of a centralized administration 
in the colonies was the trigger-factor, and not, the territories` readiness to achieve 
unification.  
The British offered abutment for the creation of the Federation of Malaya after 
World War II. In 1948, the federation was given entailment. Only in 1957, the 
federation achieved the total dislocation from British interfering and became self-
directed.  Riddled  with  points  of  reference  to  Malaya
2,  at  first  Singapore  was 
excluded  from  the  creative  process  of  the  federation.  The  changing  mindset 
occurred  in  1963,  when  Singapore,  Sabah  and  Sarawak  gained  an  official 
admission  in  the  federation.  The  entrance  was  quickly  accompanied  by  noisy 
collisions and clanging between the Singapore concept of state-building and the 
bulk of Malayan plurality. The grounds of the resulting clangor can be explained 
by  multiple  elements  that  agree  with  each  other  in  derivation  and  applied 
significance. 
Singapore  had to overcome,  throughout its  history,  a  residuum  of  demographic 
changes, buttressed by the British colonial rule. The British colonists supported the 
borderless  movements  of  large  masses  of  people,  in  and  out  their  colonial 
                                                       
1 The Southeast Asian tableland was, actually, a criss-cross game among the world`s major powers; In 
the case of the Malayan territories, Great Britain and Holland disputed with alacrity the opportunity 
for  control;  At  first,  perhaps,  the  aim  was  not  total  control;  Their  disputations  were  terminated 
through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, which placed the Northern parts of the Malayan territories 
under British Rule; Certainly, India had a very different heap of store, compared to the Malayan 
territories,  as  far  as  the  British  conception  of  exploitation  and  domination  was  concerned;  The 
imposition of colonial rule in the Malayan territories and in India was based on a quasi-chronological 
coincidence, as the British rule was introduced in India in 1858, while the Malayan territories became 
over-flown with British control, ever since the decision to place them under the administration of the 
British Colonial Office in 1867; When India no longer represented a picket for the British running 
costs, the Malayan territories gained a whole new significance.  
2 Especially, in terms of culture.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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possessions. This approach was given an official form of address, as: unlimited 
immigration.  This  would  forever  curb  and  remodel  the  ethnic  balances  of 
Singapore’s population
1. A concourse of many ethnic groups settled in Singapore, 
opening businesses and creating a life of their own, while trying to mix and join 
with  the  aboriginal  people
2.  The  largest  mass  of  these  ethnic  groups  was  the 
Chinese  one.  Singapore  very  rapidly,  became  a  Chinese  island  in  a  Malay 
Peninsula, if taking into account the demographic considerations. On the 16
th of 
September 1963, when Singapore entered the Federation of Malaya, it was clear 
that the smoldering encounters of opinion would be taking place. The wormwood 
of discontent was beginning to sow. Singapore could not agree to betray its rather 
socialist  whereabouts  in  the  public  spheres  of  policy-making.  Its  ideas  did  not 
receive  the  basic  valuation  needed  for  mutuality  to  surface.  Consequently,  the 
umbilical cord between Singapore and Malaya was cut off on the 9
th of August 
1965
3. The expression of national humiliation and of treachery – as conceived by 
Singapore’s leaders - did not go away without expressage. These historical books 
of facts are extremely important to understand the Singapore model of democracy 
and how it is replicated in security doctrines for the island-state.  
Becoming only a small tip of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore used the testimonial 
of strategic helplessness, in order to formulate its political regime and the follow-in 
security strategies
4. As Seng See Tan and Alvin Chew explain: 
“[the]  newly  independent  Singapore,  cast  adrift  from  its  hinterland  moorings 
following an unceremonious expulsion  from  the  Malaysian  Federation in 1965, 
adopted the pugnacious image of a “poison shrimp”--small, not invulnerable, but 
certainly no pushover”. (Seng, & Chew, 2008) 
Singapore started searching for the maximum leverage it could find in order to 
secure its statehood, both internally and externally.  This search would continue 
undisrupted and would be characterized by the feeling, method and measure of 
uttermost protection, by a pure and straight we feeling. Within the circumference of 
                                                       
1 Like in the case of other Southeast Asian states, demography affixed a permanent engraving of the 
country`s destiny; Other references can be given, by inferring the separatist movements in Western 
Papua (Indonesia), or in Mindanao (Philippines). 
2 These shifts were predominantly noticeable between 1890 and 1920.  
3 The Malayan leaders could not iron securely a place, within the federation, for Singapore. 
4 The sense of a state destitute of help and of strength would continue to be a matter of constant 
cropping in Singapore`s self-delivered national portrayals.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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this chronic protectiveness, we must understand the underlying principles of the 
Singapore democracy model. 
The Singapore democracy model is not a framework which refuses to settle down 
any determination. Compared, for example, with the Malaysian democracy model, 
it is a particular version, a product manufactured to bear some resemblance with 
other ways of molding democratic principles, but which assumes different values, 
constructed for the purpose to give some representing relations between the state of 
Singapore and other Southeast Asian states. Indeed, Singapore was able to create 
its own style of democracy, by introducing some principles, worthy of imitation 
and  by  giving  them  unlike  features  within  the  national  context.  These 
circumstances  may  have  created  a  sense  of  sundry-like  occasions  for 
implementation.  If  our  assertions  may  sound  too  assorted  from  a  conventional 
characterization, then how can the Singapore democracy model be characterized? 
How unconnected is it with the familiarities of Confucianism? Is it delirious for a 
unique  experimental  value?  Does  it  have  a  judicious  infirmity  to  a  socialist 
appertaining? How many questions referring to the socialist discourse regarding 
democracy does it have? How guilty can it be found for the landing on socialist 
principles?  
There is some probity, as far as the Singapore democracy model is concerned, 
which is scheduled in transportation. It is quite hard to divide the quintessential, 
original products of the Singapore democracy model, from the ones which were 
added  proportionally  from  other  sources.  The  historical  parameters  that  were 
introduced  in  the  beginning  may  offer  us  some  explanations
1.  They  gave  the 
Singapore democracy model an important face and voice for the collection of the 
principles contoured within the temporal progressions of statehood.  
                                                       
1Democracy  –  in  Singapore`s  pouts  and  statements  –  has  to  be,  first  of  all,  explained  by  a 
consanguinity with the historical facts; The point of departure of Singapore`s history as a modern 
nation and as an independent state, marked the beginning of  the prospection and of the development 
of  the  regime  that  the  new  state  chose  to  implement;  For  the  first  time  in  its  history,  after  the 
secession with Malaysia, Singapore could use the political freedom it had to ramp up and accumulate 
principles of statecraft that were best applicable; It all started out as an experiment; It is the author`s 
creed  that  Singapore,  of  all  the  Southeast  Asian  states,  had  and  still  has  the  best  availability  to 
reinvent; This is why the ideology and approach of the founding fathers of the nation could have 
suffered important divagations in the future, or it could have altered drastically, if the grounds for 
effectuation were not that fertile.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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The  assizes  of  Singapore’s  statehood  and,  in  the  lines  of  consequence,  of  its 
democracy model, were a combination of factors. First of all, it was the need for 
security recovery and the sense of perpetual invulnerability
1.  
Singapore was hallowed by the discourtesy made to it by Malaysia and also by the 
fact that it had to train itself against the impudence of other states, too. The flashier 
the security dilemma got, the biggest the challenge! The legitimacy of the new 
rulers and their continuance would have to create a natural appreciation among its 
citizens for being part of a collective structure. In this way, perceiving changes 
would occur in a manner less shaky and less instinctively hostile. It was a sound 
practical judgment of those in charge with the leadership of the country. 
At the time, the cognition of danger, as far as the regional leaders were concerned, 
came from China. The habits of speculation revolved around Chinese actions in the 
region: what could China do next, in order to impose Communism and disperse it 
in Southeast Asia? Singapore was a state with a large Chinese population and, 
naturally,  the  atmosphere  of  distrust,  had  permeated  its  regional  standing  and 
reputation.  Having  been  too  riddled  with  the  copious  accusations  that  it  can 
become the next regional outpost for China to export its model of communism, 
Singapore  began  a  campaign  to  create  a  trademark  of  a  multi-ethnic,  multi-
civilization state. In order to proclaim ownership of such an approach, Singapore’s 
leaders became influential followers of the ideas of communitarianism – a view 
upon which harmony can be instilled among different groups in society, based on 
the conventional rituals of tolerance, understanding and acceptance. 
The medium of making these underpinnings a reality would eventualy lead to the 
loss of individuality and total free spirit. An individual would have to create a place 
for itself, by accepting others and by working with others for the higher value of 
common  good.  Common  good  refers  to  collectivity,  both  in  spirit,  reflexive 
thinking and in action. Each individual can become the custodian of the other, if 
the other does not and cannot procure the means to achieve his/her goals and ideas 
in life. The state is the ultimate protector! The adherence to the conventions of the 
                                                       
1 This trait is one that most analysts think it has still major prevalence nowadays; In the beginning of 
its independent history, Singapore`s answers to the security environment of the region, were thought 
to be highly affective, given by a state prepared to experience in anticipation external dangers, which 
could subside with its virtual elimination.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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use of force can be put into practice only by the state, especially if the individuals 
prove to be unsuccessful at the endeavors of acting for their own good
1. 
Singapore could not have avoided the omission of the importations of the ideas of 
communitarianism, on the Chinese Confucian branch. The Confucian values did 
not pretermit the values of filial piety
2, the need to mend the societal pathologies 
inferred by the lack of order and coordination in society and by the establishment 
of five different types of hierarchy: ruler-ruled, husband-wife, parent-child, elder 
brother – younger brother, friend-friend. As Rachel Mc Devitt underlines:  
“The  teachings  of  Confucius  advocated  behavior  that  showed  obedience  and 
respect  for  superiors,  be  they  elder  family  members,  ancestors,  or  leaders. 
Confucius believed that humans are inherently social beings.” (Devitt, 2007)
3  
The maintenance of hierarchy is achievable only if virtue – or ren – is preserved. A 
leader has to offer to the others exemplar guidance and a moral compass in attitude 
and behavior. He can make others resort to acts of inner reformation, only if this is 
executed firstly by himself, within his own life and social interactions. Leadership 
cannot be questioned, by all means if ren is constantly ensured observance to, by 
all the members of society, especially by the leader. 
Confucianism represented a potent source of knowledge and legitimacy for the 
Singapore leaders. Its reconsiderations were not actually embraced by the leaders 
as any vitiating act would bring with it an undermining of the state’s ability to 
interfere in the private spheres of citizenship and secluded areas of the individuals` 
life. Another very important refining of the Confucian thought was brought on by 
Mengzi – one of the followers of Confucius
4. The equilibrium in the societal order 
is not a thing which can be kept on by the people’s relationship of intimacy with 
the decisions made by the political conductors of social norms. The people are not 
absentees from the pitch contour of the social order: 
                                                       
1 The preservation from loss and injury can be enacted by the state if it so choses and given the 
appropriate circumstances.  
2 Which means the reverence towards one`s elders and the duty to manifest utter devotement to one`s 
elders, by giving them the appropriate respect and, at times, protection. 
3  http://www.asian-studies.org/EAA/Confucianism_Handouts.pdf,  Accessed  on  15th  of  May  2013, 
23:44 p.m. 
4 Mencius kept on with Confucius` teachings and also masterminded the important servicing aim of 
the leadership; The imperative that the people come first introduces the imperative of an hierarchy 
plateful by the popular consent; In other words, the popular support of a political leadership can 
ensure ren.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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“Mengzi is generally acknowledged to be the most creative and influential follower 
of Kongzi (Confucius, 551-479 BCE), born about one hundred years after Kongzi's 
death.  [...]Mengzi  argued  that  the  political  legitimacy  of  a  government  derives 
from the acceptance or consent of the people. He stated clearly that the people may 
always justly overthrow a ruler who harms them”. (Doran, 2010)
1 
In  the  post-colonial  setting,  Singapore  tried  to  give  implementation  of  these 
principles, but without drawing up any indictment against the leadership of the 
nation.  A  small-sized,  encirclement-prone  state,  Singapore  could  not  afford 
allowing  the  scheduling  of  people’s  lack  of  satisfaction  to  appear  and  fester. 
Singapore had to create the institutional vehicles for the departure of those security 
arrangements most appropriate, for not being engulfed into the regional conflicts, 
fermenting during the harshest periods of the Cold War. To put it in another way, 
Singapore had to create the means of a journey already begun.  
The question was how to supply not just any means, but the desired means for its 
statehood.  Indonesia  developed  its  national  resilience  –  ketahanan  nasional
2. 
What and how could Singapore use as a frame for the inescapable relation between 
the  political  leadership  and  the  political  leadership’s  buyer  and  protection  of 
people’s interests and actions?  
We  have  to  remember  the  fact  that  Singapore  did  not  benefit  from  the  same 
material  grist  of  another  Southeast  Asian  state,  comparable  in  size  and 
geographical stretch: Brunei. Singapore did not enjoy the same concentration of 
resources  that  Brunei  had
3.  Nor  was  Singapore  privileged  with  the  British 
protection sensor that Singapore was bestowed upon. It had to stretch more its 
craftsmanship as far as its state-building ability is concerned. The break between 
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya was brought in, mostly, by ethnic dissent
4. 
The small piece of land, located in the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula would 
                                                       
1 The author of this article provides a thorough contemplation of Dr. Lim Boon Keng – a Singapore 
enlightened intellectual personality, born in a family of expats from Malaya, of Chinese descent; 
Christine Doran utilizes his work in order to draw a portrayal of the Confucian principles, through the 
prism of one of the most specialized connoisseurs; Dr. Lim, in his explanations of the Confucian 
principles, correlated with the art of conducting state affairs, makes the comprehensive link between 
the  Mencian  definition  of  the  people`s  right  to  rebel  and  John  Locke`s  concept  of  revolution; 
People`s rebellion is an auxiliary mechanism for ren to prevail. 
2 A concept born out of its longing for bargaining a regional influence, with the need to fight all forms 
of outside pressure: neocolonial or even regional, if the need will arise.  
3 With special emphasis on energy resources.  
4 The uncompromising relation between the Chinese and the Malay. RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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prove to be a very interesting mix between the Oriental elements and the Western 
ones. Just as Seng See Tan and Alvin Chew have demonstrated, Singapore was 
determined to prove its exceptional nature and the fact that it, undeservedly, was 
considered a pariah
1: 
“Singapore's leaders were interested not only in surviving external attacks, but 
also winning over the enemy. “We are not just a poisonous shrimp”, as Lee Hsien 
Loong noted in 1984, “We do not go on the basis that if somebody attacks us, we 
will hit them and will hurt them. But we will go on the basis that we will hit them 
and we will be around to pick up the pieces at the end.” (Tan & Chew, 2008)
2 
If one could take the overbearing generalization – that all island states have always 
displayed a practice of dissent – to be true, then this could easily be the most 
methodical manner to explain Singapore’s actions and why it was ousted from a 
federation where it wished to belong to, as it represented the uttermost fall-back 
arrangement,  in  terms  of  security.  However,  the  explanations  of  Singapore’s 
actions  and  of  its  adjudications  to  introduce  a  model  of  democracy,  with  a 
Confucian intake, have also to be coupled with explanations of the Singapore’s 
constitutional bodily structure, in order to be the most effective. Confucianism can 
explain the irregularities from the liberal democracy model, but it cannot explain 
the irregularities from the fineness of Asian Values. 
The roots of the constitutional model led in by Singapore can be ferreted out by the 
specific  traits  of  the  Westminster  model
3.  Singapore  has  set  up  a  paradigm  of 
parliamentary  democracy.  While  the  system  is  unicameral,  the  position  of 
President is only a position required by the ritualistic protocol. The President’s 
areas of decision are very narrow, indeed
4. The position of President is an elective 
one, with the popular legitimacy attributed to its constitutional standing.  
The members of the Parliament are selected through a very controversial system: 
they  are  either  elected  or  nominated.  For  those  who  are  nominated,  their 
                                                       
1  The  consideration  belonged  to  the  Malay  leaders  who  were  responsible  for  the  decision  of  its 
expulsion. 
2 The authors of this article comment upon the fact that Singapore tried to render as many beneficial 
outcomes as possible, from the break from the affiliation with Malaysia; Indeed, the legislative British 
inheritance could be easily seized in the formalities of the constitutional assemblage that Singapore 
introduced in the first years of statehood; This legislative framing was aiming to accommodate and 
shelter the Asian Values to which Singapore`s leaders have shown adherence.  
3 Within the same exchange of influences that India, Malaysia or even Myanmar have gone through 
as colonies of the British Empire. 
4 For instance, he can make judiciary appointments.  RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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designation is given by the President and their legislature is shorter: only two and a 
half years, compared to the longer period of the members of the parliament that are 
elected by popular suffrage, who enjoy a five-full-year term in office. Even from 
the  beginning  of  the  shaky  independence  years,  in  Singapore,  the  rife  political 
power has been concentrated in the hands of the People`s Action Party
1.  
The People’s Action Party’s trajectory to total laterality and political monopole is 
owed  to  the  political  eminence  of  Lee  Kuan  Yew.  In  1959,  Lee  became 
Singapore’s first prime-minister. His period in office totaled three decades
2. He is 
affectionately addressed in public speeches, and even in the scientific literature, as 
the  father  of  the  modern  state  of  Singapore
3.  He  made  Singapore  politics  a 
patriarchal  vault  where  the  People’s  Action  Party  could  write  the  cenotaph 
principles and informal norms. Allegations of manipulations and electoral fraud are 
all too present in the history of the People’s Action Party. Some may say that its 
existence  is,  actually,  due  to  them.  The  question  posed  is:  how  else  could  the 
political rotation to power, be so severely held in contempt by it?  
The  People’s  Action  Party  (PAP)  was  the  only  one  to  produce  the  influential 
figures for the position of prime-minister and for the most important ministerial 
positions in Singapore. It is also responsible for the self-assured and bold character 
of Singapore’s foreign policy. In addition to this, it has achieved that by creating a 
sway of containing of the military sector by the civilian leadership, as compared to 
its  neighbors  in  Southeast  Asia, Myanmar being  a  noteworthy example,  in  this 
case
4.  In  foreign  policy  terms,  Singapore  views  the  global  arena  as  a  place  of 
concentration, composed of selfish, interest-absorbed actors. Competition persists 
                                                       
1  There  are  other  political  parties  on  the  political  scene:  The  Worker`s  Party,  The  Singapore 
Democratic Party, The Singapore Democratic Alliance; Their slate was drawn as acceptable in order 
to show out political diversity; As far as their political relevance goes, we can actually characterize it 
as valueless.  
2 Goh Chok Tong would become Singapore`s second prime-minister in 1990. 
3 The need for political symbols is a constant aspect in Southeast Asia; The same showing of regard 
was given to Malaysia`s Mohamad Mahathir, for instance. 
4  The  preside  of  civilian  elements  over  the  military  sector  is  now  declared  to  be  enhancing,  in 
Myanmar, too; Nonetheless, this is viewed to be happening with baby steps; The dismissal of the 
military junta from the reins of power is not a totally successful process, as the remotion left some 
personalities of the old regime not totally out of the lustering of political influence. RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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with engrossment and Singapore has to be resourceful enough in order to be in line 
with the requirements of the competition
1! 
In domestic foreign policy, the focus-factor of the PAP has been streamlined by 
restraining civil rights and liberties, more often than not, under the umbrella of 
communitarianism.  For  instance,  Singapore`s  Internal  Security  Act  of  1985
2 
makes, under blatant specifications, clear the following facts: 
“The Minister may, if he considers it in the national interest to do so, by order 
prohibit the manufacture, sale, use, wearing, display or possession of any flag, 
banner, badge, emblem, device, uniform or distinctive dress or any part thereof” 
(Art.7.(1)
3); 
or: “Where it appears to the Minister charged with the responsibility for printing 
presses and publications that any document or publication: 
a)  contains any incitement to violence; 
b)  counsels disobedience to the law or to any lawful order; 
c)  is calculated  or  likely to lead  to  a breach  of the peace, or to promote 
feelings of hostility between different races or classes of the population; or 
d)  is  prejudicial  to  the  national  interest,  public  order  or  security  of 
Singapore” (Art.20. (1)”
4. 
The authorianism rating in Singapore is very high. The excerpts introduced above 
are only some examples of the infringement of human rights and liberties that were 
carried on by the PAP, with the compulsion of legislation. 
We  can  freely  use  the  remark  that  Singapoe  has  one  of  the  highest  rates  of 
execution in the world
1. Between the time frame of 1972-1988, Singapore acquired 
                                                       
1 The author thinks that the fight for survival no longer stands in explaining Singapore`s foreign 
policy;  Moreover,  it  is  the  fight  for  statehood  solidity  that  has  replaced  the  fight  for  statehood 
converging that the PAP has realized for Singapore during the formative period of the state`s identity. 
2 Within the revised formulations of 1987.   
3 Article 7. (1), Chapter I, Part II, Internal Security Act, 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A5ba26ddb-fd4c-
4e2e-8071-
478c08941758%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A18%2F06%2F2013%20TransactionTime%3A18
%2F06%2F2013%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0;whole=yes, Accessed on 18th of May 2013, 14:45 p.m. 
4 Article 20.(1), Part II, Chapter III, accessed at: 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A5ba26ddb-fd4c-
4e2e-8071-
478c08941758%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A18%2F06%2F2013%20TransactionTime%3A18
%2F06%2F2013%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0;whole=yes, Accessed on 18th of May 2013, 16:45 p.m. RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
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an  average 4.65
2 points,  by  the  measurements  taken,  within the  Civil  Liberties 
Index of the Freedom House
3. All media is controlled by the state. Human rights 
and civil liberties are crippled by the interference of organic laws which hint at the 
wider perspective of the Singapore`s society welfarism
4, in order to explain their 
restrictions. The means of association do not inclose plural forms
5. 
The PAP renders protective armor for the people of Singapore, but, at the same 
time, it applies principles of the Asian Values, only in their mythological tenure. 
An authentic conversation with the human rights record is not passed by a legal 
denunciation, nor by the public determining acts of perception of the ruling party. 
The  biggest  and  most  important  contortion  from  the  Asian  Values  is  that  the 
priority hierarchy, which places the voice of the people on the highest echelon, is 
turned  aside  from.  Singapore`s  model  of  democracy  is,  in  fact,  a  melange  of 
miscallanea  elements,  which  profess ground tones of heteregenous  ranging: the 
stress-mark on the Asian Values and the err and veer of how these values are 
politicized and legislated, technocratic professionalism in the public service
6, the 
socialist ideology of the PAP, the acceptance of informality in the public media of 
interactions
7. The PAP`s ideology is a socialist one and the predilect structural and 
formal  agency  is  Leninist  in  essence.  However,  the  PAP  has  syndicated  the 
domestic  interior  for  progress,  for  economic  reform,  by  providing  enough 
entailings  to  represent  a  hybrid  economic  force:  not  so  much  capitalist  as  the 
countries in the Western hemisphere, yet not so socialist in application that it can 
                                                                                                                                       
1 In some estimation, it is believed that Singapore actually has the highest rate of execution of all the 
countries in the world.  
2 In the measurements taken, 1 meaning the strongest indicator and 7 the weakest. 
3  According  to  the  data  provided  by:  http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Singapore/indicator-
civil_liberties/, Accessed on 9th of June 2013, 12:34 p.m. 
4  A  concept  that  would,  theoretically,  designate  the  employment  of  collective  benefits,  so  that 
everyone can feel and ripe the benefits of communitarism; The profit and prosperity for all, which is 
what  this  concept  is  directed  at  realizing,  cumbers  freedom  of  speech,  as  an  act  of  necessity; 
Criticisms against the government suffer from public exposure; The Asian Values do not make the 
placing of limits on people`s power of expression a conceptual kernel. 
5 There is only one associative organization – which militates for the rights of all the trade unions in 
Singapore – which is, unfortunately, controlled by the state. 
6 Meritocracy and professional advance by meritocracy are promoted; Some captious judgments may 
hint to the fact that corruption plagues the insertion of this criteria and also the actual abidance to 
them.  
7 We are consigning the use of informal dealings in day-to-day occurrences – a dwelling relation point 
with  other  Southeast  Asian  states.  In  Singapore,  they  are  accepted  only  as  long  as  they  do  not 
intermeddle with the consensus that, the state may intervene, when it considers necessary, even in 
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  28
abbreviate private economic enterprise. One of the best description of the kind of 
capitalism that Singapore`s model of democracy has created is summed up here: 
“Asian Capitalism appears be  more  hegemonic  than Asian  Democracy
1.  Asian 
Democracy did not succeed in de-legitimising counter-authoritarian (democratic) 
values; it only succeeded in postponing their realisation. Asian Capitalism, on the 
other  hand,  successful  renders  counter-capitalistic  ideologies  (welfarism)  as 
unthinkable and undesirable”. (Soek-Fang, 2001, pp. 45-66) 
Despite the fact that, after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997
2, the Asian Values 
of  the  newly  industrialized  countries  (NIC)  of  the  Asian  continent
3,  lost  the 
positive condescension  of the  rest of the world,  Singapore  was  able to  quickly 
bounce  back  and  regain  its  status  of  a  Tiger  Economy.  The  misconfiguration 
between  Asian  Capitalism  and  Asian  Democracy  still  leaves  Singapore`s 
practically unresponsive to the need of resolving this paralellism
4 and for the need 
of gap-bridging measures. 
 
Concluding Inferences 
Singapore`s model of democracy had used the Asian Values as a launching pad, 
yet it has produced else results in their application. How could Singapore have 
achieved something so divergent from the hypotethical conditions from which the 
approach wandered from? The answer is that, just like in other cases, it all comes 
down to the gutter and the narrows used in the fruition. Singapore is a country born 
                                                       
1 The concepts in italics are of the author`s choosing; They did not appear in this manner in the 
original text. 
2  The  Asian  Financial  Crisis  was  one  of  Asia`s  most  conspicuous  events;  It  checked  off  the 
downgrading of what was called the Asian Miracle – which meant the economic ascendancy in the 
global arena of some Asian economies; Speculative attacks on the Thai baht, quickly grew in rank 
and comprised all of Southeast Asia and South Korea in Northeast Asia; The crisis showed that the 
parochial organization of the regional business sector, with evidences of favoritism, patriarchal forms 
of engagement, business-planning and incessant corruption, could not foster prosperity for too long; 
Another very important upshot of the crisis was that it paved the way for the Western criticism that 
capitalism can grow vigorously only in un-authoritarian regimes; The International Monetary Fund 
had to intervene with a series of bailout plans, which imposed heavy-handed measures in the region. 
In Southeast Asia, before the crisis, the economies that were thought to have the most success were 
given  the  nominal  recommendation  of  tiger  economies;  Singapore  was  a  tiger  economy  and 
registered one of the smallest numbers of failures during the crisis. 
3 An appellation which comprised: South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. 
4 By this, we mean the lack of concurrence between Singapore`s model of capitalism and its model of 
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out of an intuitive understanding of its weaknesses – whether ethnic, civilizational, 
domestic, regional or geostrategic. Fear was not only a general atmoshphere, but 
also an active experience. The hue and timber of this feeling did not smoothen over 
time.  If  one  is  optimist,  he  can  say  that  the  feeling,  by  and  large,  stood  in  a 
resemblant state. If one likes to coat in the negative aspects also, she can say that 
time has gone by for the worst
1. 
Singapore`s model of democracy and Singapore`s model of capitalism developed 
in discrepancy, with the latter being given more space for filing its own specificity. 
Singapore was, in several occasions, called in as an example as far as its model of 
capitalism was concerned and given very bad reviews as far as its interpretation of 
Asian Values went. Even during the Asian Financial Crisis, Singapore was in the 
position to publicly countersign the measures taken by the International Monetary 
Fund in South East Asia, much to the rebuttal of other Southeast Asian countries. 
If one can ask the eonian question: which comes first democracy or capitalism? 
which is the primordial cause of the other? - in the case of Singapore, there is no 
definite answer. The Singapore’s democracy model strives in its hibridity – it is 
mightily  autocratic,  yet  it  claims  the  soft  Confucianist  values  of  collective 
emancipation  and  social  cohesion.  By  way  of  addition,  it  has  some  extraneous 
elements, compared to the economic model of capitalism, which Singapore also 
label-made, as it is not conceived within the same relative looseness.  
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